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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
opinions suggest the inability of the parties to establish conclusively the motivating
factors behind defendant's acts.
Suit against Stockholder by Creditor of Corporation - Per Curiam
The stockholder of a corporation told the president orally that if the corpo-
ration would engage in an advertising campaign, he would personally reimburse it.
The Court dismissed this action by the advertising agency inasmuch as the agency
was "at best an incidental beneficiary rather than a third-party creditor bene-
ficiary."'14 However, the defendant's defense of the Statute of Frauds was rejected
since the promise was not made to the plaintiff but to a third person.15
Contracts in Restraint of Trade - Per Curarn
In Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrind,16 the Court, in a per curiam opinion,
held that a contract with a former employee which not only prohibited him from
solociting or divulging the names of plaintiff's customers, but also required him to
obtain plaintiffs written permission before accepting any position in the shoulder
pad industry, imposed an unreasonable restraint, going beyond plaintiff's legiti-
mate interests. Therefore, the contract was void' 7 and an action was properly
dismissed which was based upon its breach and inducement of its breach.
CORPORATIONS
Stockholders' Derivative Actions
In Tropper v. Bysshe' the appellant, who owned less than two-tenths of one
per cent of the stock of the Camden Forge Company,2 brought a derivative stock-
holder's action in its behalf, naming as defendants Camden and a parent corpora-
tion which held more than 98% of Camden's stock. An order was entered
pursuant to section 61(b) of the General Corporation Law requiring appellant
to post security for expenses which Camden might incur in the action.
Section 61(b) requires a stockholder bringing a derivative action to post
security for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which security inures
14. Tomaso, Feitner and Lane, Inc. v. Brown, 4 N.Y.2d 391, 175 N.Y.S.2d
73 (1958).
15. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §460 (1936).
16. 4 N.Y.2d 393, 175 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1958).
17. N. Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAw §340.
1. 4 N.Y.2d 397, 175 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1958).
2. Plaintiff-appellant owned 200 shares of Camden's common stock, the total
market value of which was approximately one thousand dollars.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to the benefit of the corporation,3 where the stockholder owns less than 5% of
the outstanding shares of any class of stock, unless the stockholder owns stock
having a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars. The purpose of the
enactent is to prevent a small stockholder from bringing a derivative action in
bad faith, incurring litigation expenses on behalf of the corporation, thereby
depleting the corporate treasury and enabling the stockholder to "hold-up" the
corporate for private advantage.4 The enactment presupposes that a stockholder
owning more than the statutory mini.um has such an interest in the corporate
pocketbook that he will not bring a derivative action in bad faith.5
The appellant in this case contended that the shares of the defendant parent
corporation should not be counted as "outstanding shares" because the parent
corporation was in fact merely Camden's "alter ego,' and also contended that
since the purpose of the action is to protect wronged stockholders, the shares of a
wrongdoing stockholder who is named a defendant should be excluded for the
purposes of a derivative action, especially where the defendant has allegedly
benefited by the act challenged by litigation.
The Court rejected these arguments, upholding the corporate distinction
between Camden and the parent corporation and taking the view that a derivative
action is brought on behalf of the corporation and not simply on behalf of the
wronged stockholders.
The appellant also contended that the Legislature intended that a small
stockholder might escape the burden of section 61 (b) by combining with other
stockholders as plaintiffs, and that since this was impossible in this case because
the defendant owned almost all the stock,6 to enforce the statute in the absence
of an option to avoid it would be an injustice never intended by the Legislature,
because it would put wronged stockholders at the mercy of a wrongdoing
defendant stockholder.
The Court also rejected this argument, noting that section 61(b) does not
bar a derivative action but rather adds a procedural requirement. The Court,
therefore, in effect, accepted the counter-argument that the corporation
(Camden) is just as much in need of protection where the bulk of the stock is
in the hands of an allegedly wrongdoing defendant stockholder as where it is not.
3. N. Y. GENERAL CORPORATION LAw §64.
4. Noel Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 655, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143, 152 (Sup.
Ct. 1944).
5. Dalva v. Bailey, 158 F. Supp. 204, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
6. Defendant-respondent stockholder owned all but 1.85% of the stock, the
market value of which was well below the minimum statutory requirement of
fifty thousand dollars.
